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1BOUNTY HUNTERS AND 
WHISTLEBLOWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCERNS FOR FALSE CLAIMS 
ACTIONS AFTER PASSAGE OF 
THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010
A.G. HARMON, J.D., PH.D.*
 INTRODUCTION
It is an old story, oft-related, that the False Claims Act (FCA) arose in 
response to fraud perpetrated against the government in the Civil War by the 
Union military.1 Acknowledging the fact that the Federal Treasury was being 
depleted by unscrupulous profi teers submitting claims for work either never
done or only partially done, Congress took advantage of an age-old motivator:
* Clinical Associate Professor at the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic University 
of America. The author would like to thank his colleagues for their assistance with this 
article: Kathryn Kelly, Mary Leary, Sarah Duggin, Lisa Everhart, Marshall Breger, Robert 
Destro, Mark Rienzi, Suzette Malveaux, Megan LaBelle, Leah Wortham, and Dean George 
Garvey. He would also like to thank James M. Becker, Esquire, of Buchanan, Ingersoll & 
Rooney, for his insights.
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006); e.g. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and 
the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555–56 (2000) 
(explaining that the FCA was enacted during the Civil War in response to procurement 
fraud by the Union military).
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bounty.2 Regardless of the motivation, be it profi teering, revenge, or otherwise, 
as long as the government was alerted to fraud, the whistleblower could 
participate in the recovery. 
Whistleblowing has a long and storied history in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence, stretching back to medieval times, and it has found both friends 
and foes along the way.3 Attempts to reign in its powers, followed by attempts 
to expand its reach, are characteristically part of the story.4 
Recently, the FCA was amended by an even more contentious Act: the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA). In a fi ve-word 
alteration, the PPACA has greatly expanded the reach of the statute, in terms of 
how a case must be proven, who has to prove it, and what circumstances, if any, 
will bar the proceeding from going forward.5 Additionally, new constitutional 
and policy concerns stem from the increased governmental discretion in 
deciding which suits can and cannot proceed.6 The problems resulting from 
the government’s expanded discretion go to the very nature of qui tam actions 
themselves.7 
This article will address the constitutionality of the PPACA’s expansion of 
the FCA and will argue that the FCA, which was one of the latest informer 
statutes in Anglo-American jurisprudence, is no longer an informer statute at 
all. It will include a historical discussion of the constitutionality of the FCA in 
Part II,8 and an in-depth discussion of the PPACA amendments to the FCA in 
Part III.9 Part IV explains why the PPACA changes to the FCA have transformed 
the nature of the act from an informer’s statute, a type of legislation granted 
Article III standing by the Supreme Court, to a private attorney general statute, 
2. See §§ 3729-3733 (explaining that the FCA originally imposed a $2,000 penalty 
for each violation, plus a penalty equivalent to the double the government’s damages, to 
which the informer was entitled to half of the recovery).
3. See, e.g., Jon Knight, Patrolling the Unfriendly Skies: Patrolling Whistleblowers 
Through Expanded Jurisdiction, 20 FED. CIR. L. REV. 281 (2010).
4. Id..
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 782 (2010) (codifi ed as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.).  See Beverly Cohen, Kaboom! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims Under the 
Health Reform Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 77 (2011); Brian Santo, The False Claims Act: 
Analysis of the Recently Expanded Legislation on Qui Tam Actions and Related Impact 
on Whistleblowers (Jul. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/
aba_health_resource_home/Volume6_SE2_Santo.html#_ftnref2. 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1303(j)(2), 124 Stat. 901-02 (2010) (codifi ed at 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(e)(4)).
7. See Cohen, supra note 5.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
2011]            BOUNTY HUNTERS AND WHISTLEBLOWERS              3 
which is not.10 Part V sets forth the Article II Appointments clause argument 
against the newly-amended FCA,11 and Part VI sets out the fi nal Take Care 
Clause argument that arises after the aforementioned changes.12 Lastly, Part VII 
explores the policy problems that raise grave concerns regarding the PPACA 
amendments to the FCA.13
II.     HISTORY OF QUI TAM ACTIONS
A.     Great Britain: For King and Self
The essence of qui tam actions was captured in King Wihtred of Kent’s 
late seventh-century statute: “If a freeman works during the forbidden time 
[between sunset on Saturday evening and sunset on Sunday evening], he shall 
forfeit his healsfang, and the man who informs against him shall have half the 
fi ne, and [the profi ts arising from] the labour.”14 This declaration, and countless 
others, derive their power not so much from the force of sovereign declaration, 
but from the worth of the information provided.15 Indeed, the entire point 
of the qui tam action is to enhance enforcement, which is accomplished by 
incentivizing third parties to report legal transgressions.16 Historically, the 
informer was only required to bring the kind of news that the law deemed 
worthy of reward.17 The power of the bounty insured the force of the law, 
giving it teeth. 
10. See infra Part IV. 
11. See infra Part V (building upon the traditional arguments based on the same and 
explains how they have been exacerbated by the PPACA changes).
12. See infra Part VI. 
13. See infra Part VII (including a potential for increased “parasitic actions,” i.e., 
those that seek part of the reward without earning part of its victory; incentives and 
disincentives to bringing FCA actions; inherent procedural problems for both the FCA 
relator and FCA defendant that will likely present themselves due to the unpredictability 
of how the public disclosure bar will be employed; negative impacts on resources and 
recoveries; and unintended equitable and professional consequences).
14. Beck, supra note 1, at 567 (citing THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 
3, 27 (F.L. Attenborough ed. & trans., 1963)). “Healsfang” was a fi ne to avoid punishment. 
Id.  Professor Beck explains that English qui tam law had its predecessors in Roman law, 
where informers were given a right to a portion of recoveries made despite their own 
personal lack of injury. Id. at 565, n.124.
15. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R. 40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 2 (2009) (describing how a qui tam statute 
could be seen as a way to make money either by reward or blackmail).
16. Id.
17. See generally Beck, supra note 1, at 565-74 (detailing the various qui tam 
regulations that were enforced using informer provisions).   
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Informer statutes affected a number of areas of commerce, ranging from 
wool exports to silk imports, from wage hikes to beer production, from silver 
gilding to hide tanning.18 They even affected the practice of law.19  Although 
the power of informer statutes proved destructive to communal bonds, turning 
neighbor against neighbor, this problem did not quell the passage of such 
legislation.20 Worse, Professional informers cropped up to take advantage of 
the practice, venturing so far as to regulate clerical orthodoxy and to enforce 
ecclesiastical strictures.21 While the informer himself was typically held in low 
estate, lawmakers kept the statutes on the books to use the power of greed as 
a means to catch scoffl aws. Professor J. Randy Beck describes the general 
opinion of informers, characterized by no less eminent a source than Sir 
Edward Coke:  
In his Institutes of the Laws of England, Sir Coke listed ‘the 
vexatious informer’ as one among several ‘viperous Vermin’ 
preying upon the Church and the Commonwealth.  Indeed, 
informers harassed and impoverished citizens, particularly 
those in the lower classes, ‘for malice or private ends, [but] 
never for love of Justice.’ 
 Sir Coke’s attitude toward informers was similar to the 
opinion expressed by the Court of Star Chamber.22 Sir John 
Stafford initiated an action as a common informer, perhaps 
lured by the potential for easy money.23 Sir Stafford ‘was 
greatly blamed by the court that [despite] being so worthy 
a gentleman . . . he would stoop to so base an offi ce as to
18. See id. at 565, n.151-56.
19. Id. at 565 n.151.
20. Id. at 574 n.172. See also DOYLE, supra note 15, at 2 (quoting IV Holdsworth, A 
History of English Law 356 (1903): “[Qui tam Actions] brought with them . . . unintended 
consequences. They gave rise to a class of bounty hunters who unscrupulously exploited 
weaknesses in the system. ‘Old Statutes which had been forgotten were unearthed and 
used as means to gratify ill-will. Litigation was stirred up simply in order that the informer 
might compound [i.e., settle] for a sum of money. Threats to sue were easy means of 
levying blackmail.”). 
21. See Beck, supra note 1, at 576-77 (2000) (pointing out that qui tam statutes 
during Henry VIII’s reign aimed to regulate the clergy).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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be an informer, who albeit they be necessary in every well-
governed state, yet for the most part they are of the meaner 
and worst [sort].’24  
Indeed, the informer was notoriously powerful in demanding unlicensed 
settlements, procuring inconvenient venues, and casting wide nets to capture 
defendants for the most technical of offenses.25 After a long run, reforms in the 
area beginning during the reign of the Tudors gradually curbed the abuses,26 
and the actions were ultimately abolished centuries later, under the Common 
Informers Act of 1951.27
B.      American Actions
Although the qui tam story has ended in England, it is far from over here 
in America. In fact, the action’s trajectory has taken a parallel path to that 
of Great Britain.28 Colonial laws were rife with rewards for informers who 
reported on street peddling, illegal oyster gathering, out-of-season mackerel 
fi shing, and fraudulent bread trading, among other prohibited acts.29 Informer 
statutes were just as common after independence had been won from Great 
Britain, as evidenced by such cases as United States v. Simms30 and Brown v. 
United States.31
In response to fraud perpetrated against the Union Army, including the 
sale and resale of the same string of horses and the delivery of boxes full 
of sawdust instead of muskets,32 Senator Jacob M. Howard stated the logic 
behind the FCA:
24. Id. (citations omitted). It is said that “Coke’s infl uence causes a marked decline 
in the statutory recognition and encouragement of common informers.” Gerald Hurst, The 
Common Informer, 147 CONTEMP. REV. 189–90 (1935). In words that resonate with the 
Appointments Clause argument traditionally leveled against qui tam actions in this country, 
Coke also said: “The King cannot commit the sword of his justice or the oil of his mercy 
concerning any penal statute to any subject.” Id. 
25. Id.
26. The reign of George III saw a resurgence in the popularity of informer actions, 
which had fallen into disfavor, particularly with regard to Sunday observances, as required 
by the Lord’s Day Observance Act. See W. W. HARDWICKE, SUNDAY OBSERVANCE: IT’S 
ORIGIN AND MEANING 51 (1906).
27. 14 & 15 Geo. VI, ch. 39, sched. (1951). 
28. See United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 
1085 (C.D. Cal.1989) (stating that the qui tam traditions of England have followed the 
law’s development in the United States).
29. DOYLE, supra note 15, at nn.5, 14.
30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 252 (1803).
31. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
32. 33 Cong. Globe 952-960 (1863).
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The effect of them is simply to hold out to a confederate a strong 
temptation to betray his coconspirator, and bring him to justice. The 
bill offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court 
and betrays his coconspirator, if he be such; but it is not confi ned to 
that class . . . .  In short, sir, I have based the fourth, fi fth, sixth, and 
seventh sections upon the old-fashion idea of hold out a temptation, 
and ‘setting a rogue to catch a rogue,’ which is the safest and most 
expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.33 
The action remained unchanged from that time until 1943, when an attempt 
to repeal the FCA was instituted at the urging of then Attorney General, 
Francis Biddle.34 The same kind of mischief that was at the heart of medieval 
and renaissance criticisms of informer statutes can be heard in Biddle’s call 
for an abolition of an informer’s claim: “[i]nformers’ suits have become mere 
parasitical actions, occasionally brought only after law-enforcement offi cers 
have investigated and prosecuted persons guilty of violations of law and solely 
because of the hope of large rewards.”35 
Although both the House and Senate were sympathetic to the Attorney 
General Biddle’s plea and passed bills to repeal the statute, the movement came 
to a sudden and unexpected halt in 1943.36 This change of events was due to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.37 An FCA 
action concerning a collusive bidding scheme, Hess was ruled upon within 
fi ve short months of Attorney General Biddle’s plea. One of the respondent’s 
primary arguments was that the petitioner should be barred from bringing 
the action because he had based his information solely on the respondent’s 
previous indictment, and therefore had contributed no new information by way 
of his own investigation.38 Marcus involved exactly the kind of “parasitical” 
action Biddle had complained of in his letter.  
33. DOYLE, supra note 15, at 5 (quoting remarks of Senator Howard, 33 Cong. Globe 
952-960 (1863)). In another famous iteration of the theory behind the act, Justice Deady of 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon said: “[O]ne of the least expensive and 
most effective means of preventing frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of 
them liable to actions by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of 
personal ill will or the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with 
the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel.” 
U.S. v. Griswold. 24 F. 361, 365 (D.Or. 1885).
34. See Beck, supra note 1, at 558 (informing that Attorney General Biddle sent a 
letter to Congress and that, in response, Congress voted to repeal FCA qui tam provisions).
35. S. Rep. No. 77–1708, at 2 (1942); H. Rep. No. 78–263 at 2 (1943).
36. Beck, supra note 1, at 558 (describing how the bill aiming to eliminate FCA qui 
tam provisions met with strong opposition and eventually was discarded for a compromise 
legislation that narrowed but did not eliminate qui tam provisions). 
37. 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (reversing the lower court’s holding as the narrow 
interpretation disallows any criminal proceeding to be brought against respondents, thus 
immaterializing qui tam actions).
38. Id. (“the force of these considerations is entirely directed at what the government 
thinks Congress should have done rather than at what it did”). 
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However, in delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Black frustrated 
Biddle’s objective and found that the contentions of the respondents and the 
government lacked support in both statute’s language and legislative history.39 
 Justice Black justifi ed his decision to ignore Attorney General Biddle’s plea 
on the grounds that “[t]he Senate sponsor of the bill explicitly pointed out 
that he was not offering a plan aimed solely at rewarding the conspirator who 
betrays his fellows, but that even a district attorney, who would presumably 
gain all knowledge of a fraud from his offi cial position, might sue as the 
informer.”40 Further, Congress could have required a specifi c amount of “new 
information” to be produced by the informant but did not do so.41 Therefore, 
the respondent’s complaints about bad policy were being made before the 
wrong forum. Although conditions were different after the Act was passed in 
1863, the statute remained unchanged42 and the Court would not presume to 
change it for the legislature. In a worrisome aside, Justice Black even seemed 
to include the expense that the petitioner had risked in maintaining the suit as 
a justifi cation for his right to bring the action, regardless of whether he had 
provided new information or not.43
The idea that the informer statute allowed a petitioner to bring an action 
regardless of whether he contributed anything to the case inspired a full-
throated dissent from Justice Jackson. He argued that:
[T]here is nothing in the text or history of this statute which 
indicates to me that Congress intended to enrich a mere busybody 
who copies a Government’s indictment as his own complaint and 
who brings to light no frauds not already disclosed and no injury 
the Treasury not already in the process of vindication.44
39. Id. at 547 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863) (alteration 
in original).
40. Id.
41. Id. at n.9 (interpreting that the lack of language requiring a large amount of 
information essentially mean that Congress did not intend to negate rewards to those 
informants who offered only a small amount of information). 
42. Id. (suggesting that Congress’ decision not to set forth the required amount of 
new information necessary in order to receive a reward allows thesimplest of informants to 
earn a a reward). 
43. Id. at 545–46. See James T. Blanch, The Constitutionality of the False Claims 
Act’s Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 701, 713–14 (1993). The argument 
that the qui tam relator has standing because he has invested an interest in the outcome has 
been roundly dismissed. The Supreme Court rejected it in Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. 
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 765 (2000). 529 U.S. at  765 (holding that the 
United States’ injury conferred standing on relator to bring qui tam civil action under FCA 
and the state was not a “person” under qui tam liability). See discussion in Part III infra.
44. Hess, 317 U.S. at 558.
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Justice Jackson was sure that it was never Congress’ intent to authorize 
this misuse of the statute. If that statute had, in fact, authorized this abusive 
proceeding ever since 1863, then “the legal profession of the United States has 
been strangely unresponsive to a Congressional proffer of windfall income.”45 
Justice Jackson called upon Congress to intervene and stop the apparent abuse 
and corruption created by the statute’s misuse.46 Justice Jackson went on to 
make several other points contradicting the majority’s logic, and he proved 
prescient in his remark that only Congress could intervene to prevent the 
consequences that the Marcus decision would bring about.47 Congress quickly 
passed the 1943 amendments to the FCA, which instituted the public disclosure 
bar and effectively overruled the case.48
In addition to Justice Jackson’s stated arguments against the majority’s 
view in Marcus, other arguments highlight the problem created by permitting 
informer statutes to require no information. First, Justice Black’s explanation 
of Senator Howard’s remarks from the fl oor debate in 1863 does not take the 
statement in the proper context. Senator Howard is not using his “district 
attorney” example to contend that “new” information is unnecessary, but 
to make it clear that the class of those who may be informers is not limited 
to co-conspirators that are in league with the defendant. Rather, Senator 
Howard’s point is that someone outside the class of conspirators—such as the 
district attorney—could bring the suit. 49  However, that some kind of useful 
information must be brought by the petitioner—district attorney or not—is 
understood as a condition to that suit. 
45. Id. at 559.
46. Id. at 559 (stating that Congress should be clearer with regard toabout its 
legislative intent).
47. Justice Jackson feared the government’s loss of control over prosecution and 
the possibility of collusion between a relator and the defendant. Id. at 561. The latter 
possibility has always been a problem with qui tam actions. See Beck, supra note 1, at 
551–52, 574 (explaining how potential qui tam defendants learned how to turn the system 
of private prosecution to their advantage as the outcome in a quit tam suit was binding on 
the government).
48. See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (1943) (codifi ed as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006)). After the Marcus decision, some opposition arose to an 
outright repeal of the action. See DOYLE, supra note 15 at 2; Beck, supra note 1, at 7. The 
compromise required the relator to disclose his evidence to the government and wait sixty 
days for an intervention decision, forbade claims based on information already possessed 
by the government, and reduced the relator’s share of the recovery. Beck, supra note 1, at 
357 & nn.45–47.
   49. That the district attorney could do such a thing at the time is only a refl ection 
of the state of the justice system in the nineteenth century. Justice Jackson complained 
along these lines, criticizing Justice Black’s interpretation of Senator Howard’s words. 
Justice Jackson said the senator’s remarks about the district attorney had to be placed in the 
context of a nation that did not yet have a Department of Justice, FBI, etc. See Marcus v. 
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 560 (1943).
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 The second point against Justice Black’s interpretation follows from the 
fi rst: that there can be no meaningful distinction between “information” 
and “new information” in an informer statute. For the informer statute to 
incentivize reports of legal transgressions, the petitioner must bring useful 
information; otherwise, the word “information” is meaningless, as the relation 
of old news informs the government of nothing. As Jackson implies, without 
useful information that enhances what the government already knows, the 
law ceases to be a reformer statute altogether and becomes a private attorney 
general statute entitling the relator to a windfall profi t. In so doing, it runs into 
the Appointments Clause problems that have historically been part of the qui 
tam criticisms, which will be discussed below. 
 The history of informer statutes from England to America and down to 
Marcus was based on the qui tam relator relaying information, not repeating 
information already possessed. If that were the case, qui tam actions would 
not be “informer” statutes, but “repeater” statutes.  This is an important point, 
as it goes to the very nature of how informer statutes have been understood. 
In fact, the 1943 Amendments to the FCA, as well as the subsequent 1986 
Amendments, both focused on enhancing the statute’s power by way of 
making sure that useful information is provided.50 While the 1943 amendments 
excluded parasitic information, the 1986 amendments reinvigorated the statute 
by expanding the defi nition of false claims and refi ning the jurisdictional 
bar, along with other changes.51 However, the law was intended as, and has 
been applied as, an informer statute—a means to gain information about 
legal transgressions that might not otherwise be known.52 The tenuous
50. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (1943) (codifi ed as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006)); False Claims Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 
3153 (codifi ed as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006)). The Fraud Enforcement 
and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”) also amended the FCA in a variety of ways that 
expanded liability and enforcement provisions, but not in ways directly relevant to the 
constitutional concerns discussed in this part. For a discussion of FERA’s impact on the 
FCA, see generally 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 1.09 
(4th ed. 2009). 
51. See supra, Part II. The legislative history of the 1986 amendments reveal that 
the knowledge of fraud provides a constructive role to the action, and serves as the reason 
behind the qui tam actions. The law was meant to “deputize ready and able people who 
have knowledge of fraud against the government to play an active and constructive role 
through their counsel to bring to justice those contractors who overcharge the government.” 
132 CONG. REC. H9388 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman); the 1986 
Amendments’ legislative history also includes this statement, relative to relator information: 
“Detecting fraud is usually very diffi cult without the cooperation of individuals who are 
either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity.” S. REP. NO.99–345 
(2d Sess. 1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 5266 (1986) (emphasis added).
52. See DOYLE, supra note 15; Beck supra note 1, at 567 (indicating that numerous 
qui tam statutes were enforced if the informer provided information to the authorities about 
the specifi c crime indicated in the statute).
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constitutionality of the amendments has rested on this “informer” nature, 
which stretches back to Roman times.53 
The “informer” nature is precisely what the PPACA has fundamentally 
changed about the FCA. These changes open the statute up to new arguments 
based on Article III standing, the Article II Appointments Clause, and the 
Article II “Take Care” clause. 
III.     PPACA CHANGES TO THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR
 Prior to passage of the PPACA, a qui tam relator could be jurisdictionally 
barred from bringing an FCA action under certain circumstances, a result of 
changes made through the 1986 amendments. Up until the last year, the statute 
read as follows:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this 
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions 
in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
administrative, or Government  Accounting Offi ce report, hearing, 
audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is 
brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is 
an original source of the information.
 (B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an 
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the 
information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily 
provided the information to the Government before fi ling an action 
under this section which is based on the information.54
In short, the section barred suits brought by what Attorney General Biddle 
described as “parasitic plaintiffs,” individuals who provide information 
already disclosed through an enumerated outlet and cannot show that they are 
an original source of that information.55 Subsequent to this latest iteration of 
the statute was a long history of litigation over the issues of whether an actual 
disclosure occurred, whether the relator’s information was “based upon”
53. See Beck, supra note 1, at 566 (offering historical background and nature of the 
statutes at that time indicating that qui tam statutes arose from the Roman criminal law 
system which offered a portion of the defendant’s property as a reward for successful 
prosecution of the crime).  
54. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 11-148, 124 
Stat. 119 § 10104(j)(2)(4)(A)).
55. See Beck, supra note 1, at 558 (motivaing both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate to vote to repeal the FCA qui tam provisions).
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previously disclosed matter, and whether the depth of the relator’s knowledge 
was “direct and independent.”56 
However, the PPACA changed the focus of subsequent litigation when it 
amended the above stated language. The pertinent part of the statute now reads 
as follows:
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, 
unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same 
allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were 
publicly disclosed—
 (i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the 
Government or its agent is a party; 
 (ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Offi ce, or other 
Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or 
 (iii) from the news media,  
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person 
bringing the action is an original source of the information.
 (B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an 
individual who either 
(i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has 
voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on which 
allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or 
(ii) who has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds 
to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has 
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before fi ling 
an action under this section.57 
The revision of the statute is of great procedural importance, as it reforms 
the public disclosure bar from jurisdictional challenge to an affi rmative 
defense.58 Also, the signifi cance of the addition of the phrase “materially adds 
to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions,” is unclear. Further, the 
elimination of state and local administrative, reports, audits and investigations 
as sources that could activate the public disclosure bar effectively overruled 
a Supreme Court decision handed down contemporaneously with the passage 
56. See Boese, supra note 50 at § 4.02. An examination of the public disclosure bar’s 
effect on “unworthy whistleblowers” prior to the PPACA amendments to the FCA, is the 
subject of Robert Salcido’s article: Screening Out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An 
Historical Analysis of the Public Disclosure Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under 
the False Claims Act, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 237, 242-43, 260 (1995).
57. 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2010) (emphasis added), amended by Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A)). 
58. The defendant now will bear the proof of whether the information is publicly 
disclosed and that the plaintiff does not qualify as an original source, a great sea change in 
responsibility.  
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of the PPACA.59 However, the focus of this article is on the fi rst highlighted 
addition: “unless opposed by the Government.”60 
For with that fi ve word alteration, which gives the government a veto over 
the public disclosure bar, regardless of the subsequent language in the statute 
relating to that bar’s administration, Congress has unintentionally strengthened 
the constitutional arguments that have traditionally been leveled at the FCA. A 
discussion of each will follow.
IV.      ARTICLE III STANDING
Fairchild v. Hughes,61 a 1922 decision by the Supreme Court, introduced 
the standing doctrine. Under this doctrine, actions that did not rise to the level 
of Article III “cases and controversies” were thereafter dismissed as non-
justiciable.62 As time passed, a party would no longer be entitled to a hearing 
just because it had requested “a court of the United States to declare its legal 
rights, and . . . couched that request for forms of relief historically associated 
with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal 
process.”63 
The doctrine came to have three requirements: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion 
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, 
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . .  trace[able] to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the 
independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it 
must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).64
59. PPACA, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A) (2010); see Graham 
Cnty. Soil & Water Cons. Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S.Ct. 1396 (2010).
60. The legislative history of the amendment is nonexistent. The record simply reads 
the amended language into the day’s events without comment or discussion. See PPACA, 
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A) (2010).
61. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
62. See id.
63. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1974). 
64. The shorthand reference to these requirements is injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability.
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Arguments passed back and forth for years over whether a qui tam relator, 
who has not been injured in fact, deserves Article III standing.65 Then the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.66 
In Stevens, the relator was a former employee of the Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources, whom the relator alleged had submitted false claims to 
the Environmental Protection Agency in violation of the FCA.67 The agency 
moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that a state and/or state agency is 
not a “person” under the statute.68 
In addressing the issue of whether the relator had Article III standing to 
bring the suit, Justice Antonin Scalia, delivering the opinion, rehearsed the 
traditional Article III standing doctrine.69 He then pointed out that while the 
government had undoubtedly suffered injury itself, “Art. III judicial power 
exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining 
party.”70 He then dismissed a set of arguments traditionally made in favor of 
qui tam realtor standing.71
65. Modern analysis of the constitutional arguments for and against qui tam standing, 
as well as arguments on other grounds, are included in the following articles: Blanch, 
supra note 43; John D. Bressler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private 
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511 (1994); Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui 
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L. J.  341 (1989); Sean Hamera, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and 
Policy Issues Posed by the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 89 (1997); Edward A. Hartnett , The Standing of the United States: How Criminal 
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in all the Wrong Places, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 2239 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public 
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and 
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988). 
66. 529 U.S. 765 (2000). Scholarship analyzing standing in the qui tam area post-
Stevens includes: Heather Elliot, Congress’s Inability To Solve Standing Problems, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 159 (2011); Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and 
Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023 (2009); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the 
Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939 (2002); Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took 
History and the Rule of Law Seriously?,12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155 (2001).
67. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 769.
68. See id. at 772–73.
69. See id. 771–73 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ, 523 U.S. 83, 
93–102 (1998); Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
180–81 (2000); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976); Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
70. Id. at 771–72 (citing  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)) (emphasis added).
71. Id. 772–73 (citing Valley Forge Christ. College v. Am. United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
734–35 (1972)).
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First, the argument that the relator is an agent of the United States, entitled to 
a bounty, did not suffi ce to establish an “injury in fact” for Article III standing 
purposes.72  The relator has more than the mere right to retain a fee out of the 
recovery, but also has an interest in the lawsuit by means of the statute.73
[I]t provides that “[a] person may bring a civil action for a violation of 
section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government,” § 
3730(b) (emphasis added); gives the relator “the right to continue as 
a party to the action” even when the Government itself has assumed 
“primary responsibility” for prosecuting it, § 3730(c)(1); entitles the 
relator to a hearing before the Government’s voluntary dismissal of 
the suit, § 3730(c)(2)(A); and prohibits the Government from settling 
the suit over the relator’s objection without a judicial determination 
of “fair[ness], adequa[cy] and reasonable[ness],” § 3730(c)(2)(B).74
Indeed, some explanation of standing other than status as a Government agency 
is necessary for the relator to retain a portion of the recovery.
Justice Scalia also dismissed the argument referred to obliquely in Marcus, 
that the relator has a “concrete private interest in the outcome of [the] suit” 
by way of his interest in the potential bounty.75 This interest cannot give rise 
to Article III standing either, said the Court, as it is merely a byproduct of 
the suit and is not a cognizable injury in fact.76 Although these arguments 
were insuffi cient to establish Article III standing for the qui tam relator, the 
Court went on to fi nd an “adequate basis” for standing based on two distinct 
arguments: 1) “representational standing,” in that the relator serves as the 
assignee of the government’s claim77; and 2) the “long tradition of qui tam 
actions in England and the American Colonies.”78
The PPACA amendments to the FCA most directly impact the second 
argument for constitutional standing—the one based on historical grounds. 
That is because Justice Scalia draws upon early English cases from the 
thirteenth century to establish the legacy for the actions, stating that the most 
relevant aspect of the analysis before the Court were statutes “that allowed 
informers to obtain a portion of the penalty as a bounty for their information, 
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Marcus at 545–46; Stevens at 772 (citing Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
573 (1992)).
76. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 102 
(2001)).
77. Stevens at 773–74 (clarifying that the qui tam relator sues as a “partial assignee” 
of the United States). 
78. Id.
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even if they had not suffered an injury themselves.”79 The Court went on to 
speak of the prevalence of qui tam actions in America around the time of the 
Constitution’s framing, particularly characterizing all of them as “informer” 
statutes.80 This history, Justice Scalia said:
 
[was] well nigh conclusive with respect to the question before us 
here: whether qui tam actions were “cases and controversies of the 
sort traditionally amenable to and resolved by the judicial process.” 
When combined with the theoretical justifi cation for relator standing 
discussed earlier, it leaves no room for doubt that a qui tam relator 
under the FCA has Article III standing.’”81
The importance of the Court’s understanding of the long litany of English 
and American qui tam actions as “informer” statutes is central to the standing 
argument because the PPACA amendment has fundamentally changed the 
nature of the FCA. In short, the FCA, which was one of the latest informer 
statutes in Anglo-American jurisprudence, is no longer an informer statute at 
all. 
 As the newly codifi ed government veto over the public disclosure bar:
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, 
unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same 
allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were 
publicly disclosed . . . 82  
79. Id. at 775 (emphasis added) (citing Statute Prohibiting the Sale of Wares After the 
Close of Fair, 5 Edw. III, ch. 5 (1331); Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. VI, ch. 39, 
sched. (1951) (listing informer statutes)). The Court also took note of the many abuses of 
the informer statutes that plagued English law. 
80. Stevens at 776-77 (citing, among others, “Act for the Restraining and Punishing 
of Privateers and Pirates, 1st Assembly, 4th Sess. (N.Y. 1692), reprinted in 1 Colonial Laws 
of New York 279, 281 (1894) (allowing informers to sue for, and receive share of, fi ne 
imposed upon offi cers who neglect their duty to pursue privateers and pirates)”; “Act of 
Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 102 (allowing informer to sue for, and receive half of fi ne 
for, failure to fi le census return); Act of July 5, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 129 (extending same 
to Rhode Island); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (allowing private 
individual to sue for, and receive half of fi ne for, carriage of seamen without contract or 
illegal harboring of runaway seamen); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137-138 
(allowing private individual to sue for, and receive half of goods forfeited for, unlicensed 
trading with Indian tribes); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 209 (allowing person 
who discovers violation of spirits duties, or offi cer who seizes contraband spirits, to sue 
for and receive half of penalty and forfeiture, along with costs, in action of debt); cf. Act of 
Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 16, 17, 1 Stat. 116 (allowing informer to conduct prosecution, and 
receive half of fi ne, for criminal larceny or receipt of stolen goods)”).
81. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 777-78 (2000).
82. 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2006) (emphasis added), amended by Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A)). 
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makes entirely optional, at the government’s instance, the conditions that have 
traditionally barred a claim on the grounds that the relator is not the original 
source of information already publicly disclosed.  In other words, one 
of the bases upon which the Stevens Court found Article III standing in an 
FCA claim—that it is an informer statute, of the type which has been afforded 
standing throughout Anglo-American history—is not applicable to actions 
brought under a statute that is no longer, in fact, an informer statute.83 The 
revised FCA does not require that a relator either provide information or suffer 
the dismissal of his action—as will be the case whenever the government 
objects to the workings of the public disclosure bar in the FCA. This need 
not always be so, as in instances when the government does not choose to 
intervene. Nevertheless, the change makes the FCA, at best, only a “quasi-
informer” statute. To emphasize this point by way of its effect, when a petitioner 
who would have been barred jurisdictionally is not in fact barred, the statute 
rewards a repeater of information, not a provider of it.84 
In short, the government veto over the public disclosure bar turns any 
plaintiff whose FCA action has been saved from dismissal into a private 
attorney general, a bounty hunter whose investment in the outcome is his only 
tie to the disposition of the matter. And as Justice Scalia stated in Stevens, a 
party’s interest in the recovery that might be won is no different from that of 
one who has placed a wager upon the outcome.85 Neither is a basis for Article 
III standing.86 Indeed, the PPACA amendment to the FCA is precedent for any 
claimant—either with the most tenuous ties to the subject matter or with none 
at all—to claim that his willingness to fi nance an action permits him a right to 
bring a suit, as long as the government consents.87
The second argument by the Court in Stevens for fi nding constitutional 
standing set out in Stevens—that the relator acts as an “assignee” of the United 
States—is also affected by PPACA.88 While the Court’s opinion anticipated 
circumstances in which the government allows all qui tam relators to be 
assignees, it did not anticipate circumstances in which the assignment is made 
through a member of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and is then passed on—
at the DOJ’s sole discretion—to a qui tam plaintiff chosen by way of unstated, 
unspecifi ed criteria. A situation in which DOJ members could select assignees 
according to unstated procedures was not a scenario before the Court when it 
considered Stevens.89 
83. See supra pp. 13–16.
84. See supra pp. 13–17.
85. Stevens at 772-774.
86. See supra pp. 13–17.
87. See supra pp. 13–17.
88. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 
765, 774–75 (2000).
89. See supra pp. 13–16.
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Therefore, both arguments for Article III standing in FCA qui tam actions 
have been compromised and are subject to challenge in a post-PPACA 
landscape.
V.     ARTICLE II APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The new constitutional concerns raised by the PPACA amendment based on 
the Appointments Clause follow closely from the concerns related to Article III 
standing discussed in the immediately preceding section. For the government 
veto not only changes the nature of the FCA from an informer statute into 
a private attorney general statute, but also vests the power by which the 
transformation takes place solely in the DOJ.90 According to the language of 
the amendment, that power is exercised at its sole discretion.91 In other words, 
standing may “spring” based upon governmental fi at. Consequently, problems 
arise with regard to both the separation of powers doctrine and the doctrine of 
non-delegable duties.92
Article II of the Constitution states that the President:
“[S]hall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the [S]upreme [C]ourt, and all other Offi cers 
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress 
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Offi cers, as they 
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
Heads of Departments.” 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 .
The constitutional argument against qui tam actions based on this clause 
stems from the fact that relators are not nominated by the President and are not 
approved by the Senate.93 
90. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why 
it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2145–46 (2004). 
91. 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2010), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A)).
92. See infra pp. 19 –20.
93. See Blanch, supra note 21, at 737–38. But see, Caminker, supra note 65, at 374–
80.
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For a time, it was argued that in the FCA, Congress had aggrandized its 
powers at the expense of the Executive.94 This was arguably a violation of the 
rule established in Buckley v. Valeo.95 Although the Federal District Courts 
were not responsive to the suggestion that Congress had increased its powers 
through the enactment of the FCA,96 this argument is not the only critical 
approach parties have taken based on the clause. 
In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,97 the petitioners contended 
that a statute allowing the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court to 
appoint special trial judges was in violation of the Appointments Clause.98 The 
petitioner claimed that a special trial judge is an “inferior Offi ce[r]” that has to 
be appointed by the Executive and does not fall within one of the Constitution’s 
three repositories of the appointment power: the President, the courts of law, 
or the heads of departments.99 The Court held that the Appointments Clause 
could be violated not only by Congress’ arrogation of powers, but also by its 
diffusion of powers:100 
The Appointments Clause prevents Congress from dispensing 
power too freely, as it limits the universe of eligible recipients 
of the power to appoint. Because it articulates a limiting 
principle, the Appointments Clause does not always serve 
the Executive’s interests. For example, the Clause forbids 
Congress to grant the appointment power to inappropriate 
members of the Executive Branch. Neither Congress nor the 
Executive can agree to waive this structural protection. ‘The 
assent of the Executive to a bill which contains a provision 
contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from judicial 
review.’101
94. See, e.g., Ryder v. U.S., 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
95. 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976).
96. E.g. United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 
1094 (C.D. Cal.1989).
97. 501 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1991).
98. Id.
99. Id. 
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 (1983)) (“The assent of the Executive 
to a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from 
judicial review”).
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The Court went on to hold that a “tax court” is a “Court of Law” in the sense 
contemplated by Article III.102 Still, the rationale regarding diffusion of powers 
speaks directly to the PPACA amendments to the FCA.103 As stated above, in 
the amended FCA, Congress has delegated to the DOJ, at its fi at, the ability to 
create standing—or not—using criteria unstated in the statute.104 
In addition, one of the permissible repositories of appointment power, 
“Heads of Departments,” has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of 
Labor,105 the Chief Justice of the Tax Court,106 and cabinet members, not 
“mere bureau heads.”107 Whether a multitude of district attorneys in charge 
of the government’s interests in an array of FCA actions can be construed as 
synonymous with “Heads of Departments” has yet to be determined. 
Furthermore, even if Congress has the power to confer such standing, and 
even if it could allow the Executive branch to exercise the kind of authority 
that the amended FCA provides, Congress has delegated this standing-creating 
power without providing an intelligible principle to guide the Department of 
Justice’s actions.108 
In Mistretta v. United States,109 the Supreme Court permitted the delegation 
of Congressional power, but only up to a point.110 The Court said: “so long as 
Congress ‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which 
the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed 
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative 
power.’”111 
However, in the amended FCA, it is not simply a matter of no intelligible 
standard provided to the DOJ for applying its veto over the public disclosure 
bar, there is no standard provided whatsoever. Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Mistretta speaks even more forcefully to this current set of circumstances than 
it did to the case before the Court in 1989:
102. 501 U.S. 868, 891–93 (1991).
103. See supra pp. 10–12.
104. See supra pp. 10–17.
105. See Varnadore v. Sec’y of Labor, 141 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1998).
106. See Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Rev., 930 F.2d 975, 993–94 
(2d Cir. 1991).
107. See Brooks v. U.S., 33 F. Supp. 68, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); see also Surowitz v. U.S., 
80 F. Supp. 716, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (considering whether a war department attorney 
prosecuting war crimes is an “inferior offi cer” under Article II).
108. See supra pp.10–17.
109. 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
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As John Locke [stated] almost 300 years ago, ’[t]he power of the 
legislative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary 
grant and institution, can be no other, than what the positive grant 
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, 
the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making 
laws, and place it in other hands.’ J. Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government 87 (R. Cox ed.1982) (emphasis added) . . . Or as we 
have less epigrammatically said: ‘[t]hat Congress cannot delegate 
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized 
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution.’ Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 
U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (emphasis added).
Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 419–20 (1988). 
Whatever criteria the DOJ were to use in determining when to apply the 
veto would arguably be legislative in nature, and therefore in violation of the 
Appointments Clause under Article II.  
VI.     ARTICLE II “TAKE CARE” CLAUSE
The third argument traditionally leveled at the constitutionality of qui 
tam actions is also based on the separation of powers doctrine.112 In Article 
II, the Constitution requires that the President “shall take Care that the laws 
[are] faithfully executed.”113 The argument has been that a relator’s semi-
prosecutorial action on behalf of the government takes away the Executive’s 
branch’s control over the litigation, which is in violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine.114 
112. Each of the three arguments is a different aspect of one “separation of powers” 
argument, says James T. Blanch. See Blanch, supra note 21, at 747–50. The Lujan Court 
correlated the standing and the Take Care arguments: “[i]f the [standing doctrine’s] concrete 
injury requirement has the separation-of-powers signifi cance we have always said, the 
answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest 
in executive offi cers’ compliance with the law into an ’individual right’ vindicable [sic] 
in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief 
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.” Art. II, § 3. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).  
113. U.S. CONST.. art. II, § 3.
114. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 65, at 356 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 832 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976)).
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Of the three different arguments, this line of criticism seems to have been 
somewhat attenuated by the PPACA, in that the government veto gives the 
DOJ a new level of control—albeit mysterious in its criteria—at least insofar 
as the workings of the public disclosure bar are concerned.115 This means that 
the government now has the power to decide when to allow a suit and when 
not to allow it. 
However, the indeterminate nature of this application is itself problematic. 
As stated above, the PPACA has created: 1) the new Article III standing 
problem based on the changed nature of the FCA from an informer statute 
to a private attorney general statute; and 2) the new Article II Appointments 
Clause problem based on the separation of powers and non-delegable duties 
doctrines.116 When taken in conjunction with these two issues, a decision 
allowing an action to proceed by means of unstated criteria, written and 
applied not by Congress, but by the DOJ, is arguably an abdication of the 
government’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. 
This is similar to the rationale employed in Freytag, which found that 
Congress could violate the Appointments Clause not only by arrogation of 
its powers, but also by diffusion of them.117 Here the argument proceeds that 
the Executive is diffusing, and obfuscating, its powers in favor of a private 
individual whose only stake in the suit is in the possible recovery he may 
enjoy.118 In this scenario, the specter of the undeserving parasitic plaintiff 
returns, but alongside him is a complicit Executive branch.
VII.     POLICY PROBLEMS
In addition to the constitutional problems raised by the PPACA amendments 
to the FCA, new policy concerns also arise. The impact of the government veto 
over the public disclosure bar will likely affect the kinds of plaintiffs attracted 
to the actions, the FCA’s fi rst-to fi le bar, the amount of recoveries received, and 
the judicial resources spent. Notions of equity and professional propriety are 
likely to occur as well.
115. See 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2011), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A)); supra pp.10–11 (describing PPACA’s alterations to the 
FCA statute, including the addition of language that provides for a government veto of a 
court dismissal). 
116. See supra pp. 12–19.
117. 501 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1991).  See supra pp.17–18.
118. Id.
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A. Parasitic Actions
Since the institution of informer statutes, the public disclosure arena has 
been plagued with what former Attorney General Biddle called “parasitic 
actions.”119 In these cases, the plaintiff has made no contribution of information 
and performs no purpose except to fund the expenses of the lawsuit in the 
event that the government does not intervene.120 
Obviously, the notion behind informer statutes is that otherwise undetectable 
fraud will be brought to light by those closest to its connivance—whether a 
confederate to the scheme or an innocent witness.121 However, a case in which 
the plaintiff brings no new information to the government frustrates the entire 
enterprise.122 In the worst cases, such plaintiffs perpetrate their own type of 
fraud in the pursuit of fraudulent perpetrators, demanding a bounty that they 
have not earned.123 Even when the plaintiff earnestly believes he has made a 
contribution to the case, the particularities of the public disclosure bar have 
excluded his participation in the recovery when he cannot show that he is the 
original source of the information.124 As has been argued here, this saves the 
informer statute from becoming a repeater’s statute.
Now that the PPACA amendment has made that bar conditional upon the 
government’s fi at, the likelihood of parasitic actions equivalent to the pre-1943 
state of affairs—the very type of action outlined in Attorney General Biddle’s 
letter to Congress—has increased.125 The only thing stopping such a turn of 
events is the government’s refusal to exercise the veto, but how and when and 
why that should occur is an open question.126
119. S. Rept. No. 77-1708, at 2; H. Rept. No. 78-263 at 2. See also Beck, supra note 1.
120. Id.
121. See Beck, supra note 1, at 565-74.
122. See supra pp. 5–7.
123. See supra p. 10.
124. See supra p. 10.
125. See Cohen, supra note 5.
126. An interesting type of abuse to which informer statutes were prone in the past was 
the possibility of collusion between an “informer” who was friendly to the defendant. By 
bringing a useless action at the instance of the defendant, the informer could be rewarded 
by his confederate after the suit was dismissed. Beck, supra note 1, at 574. As stated 
above, Justice Jackson feared the problem arising again when the relator had no ties to the 
information of the suit. Id. This is yet another example of how creative abuses may become 
when there is no effective means by which to screen out parasitic plaintiffs. 
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B. Incentives and Disincentives
Another consequence, however unintended, of the new government veto 
relates to the whistleblower’s incentive to come forward with real information—
that is, useful news of fraud. Under the FCA, “[w]hen a person brings an action 
under this subsection, no person other than the Government can intervene or 
bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.”127
Since there is no longer an outright bar to suits that would have been 
dismissed in the past on the grounds that the relator is not the original source of 
disclosed information, the race to the courthouse will likely become fi erce.128 
That is because a tie to the subject matter is not a defi nitive prerequisite to 
the action. In fact, it might be in the government’s interest to allow the action 
to proceed, as in cases where the plaintiff has the fi nancial resources to fund 
the suit himself. The government could encourage the “useless” repeater to 
fi le the action. Unfortunately, the true informant, i.e., one with useful news of 
fraud, will be barred by the fi rst-to-fi le bar in section 3730 if he is late to the 
fi ling offi ce and his information overlaps in some respect with the fi rst fi ler—
resulting in a potential loss of valuable information.129 
Perversely, the PPACA government veto amendment to the FCA prejudices 
those with real contributions who are not fast enough to the game. This kind of 
unseemliness was one of the points in former Attorney General Biddle’s letter 
that prompted the 1943 Amendments.130 With the passage of PPACA, the stage 
is set for a similar contortion of affairs. 
Even the arguments of those who have championed the constitutionality of 
qui tam provisions are undone by these policy considerations. For example, 
one supportive scholar wrote that the qui tam authorization could not be 
successfully replaced by a reward incentive regime:
None of these purposes served by qui tam authorization would 
similarly be served by replacing it with a reward incentive regime 
authorizing the DOJ to offer informers a monetary reward for 
disclosing their knowledge of fraudulent activities if and when the 
DOJ successfully litigated an action based on their information. 
Congress determined that . . . many potential informers are reluctant 
to come forward because they refuse to accept the “personal and 
fi nancial risk”. . . . Second, such a reward regime would not utilize 
the resources of the private citizenry to supplement the limited public 
resources with which the DOJ can enforce the Act. Finally, such a 
regime would not discourage executive complacency.131
127. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2006).
128. See Cohen, supra note 5.
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2006).
130. S. Rept. No. 77-1708, at 2; H. Rept. No. 78-263 at 2. See also Beck, supra note 1.
131. Caminker, supra note 65, at 352 (fi nding that a reward incentive regime “would 
not discourage executive complacency”).
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But with the effect of the government veto, not only is the sole incentive the 
monetary reward, the sole requirement is the willingness to fund the litigation. 
To the extent that the executive complacency feared in the quoted passage 
exists, it can only be exacerbated by a plethora of qui tam plaintiffs who are 
willing to fund the enterprise and use the considerable power of the action, 
made even more powerful—especially with its newly enhanced status—to 
bring defendants to the settlement table.
In addition, the lack of any standard for applying the government veto of the 
public disclosure bar could itself incentivize abuse. This possibility is over and 
above the constitutional concerns in the context of the Appointments Clause.132 
For without any standard for guidance in its application, the exercise or non-
exercise of the veto could be motivated by political concerns. There is nothing 
to stop the veto from being employed to save those relators who bring claims 
friendly to a particular administration’s goals, neither is there anything to stop 
it from being foregone when relators bring claims that are hostile to those 
goals. However unintended such a consequence might be, the potential for this 
abuse has been introduced along with the vagaries of the amendment.
C. Procedural Concerns
In addition, without guidance as to when a relator is to be defi nitively barred, 
i.e., such as when the defendant has proven that he is not the original source of 
publically disclosed information—neither the qui tam plaintiff nor the qui tam 
defendant can predict how the action will proceed.133 The FCA plaintiff will 
be unsure as to when the veto will be exercised or not, and on what grounds 
the government might save his action from dismissal or refuse to do so.134 On 
the other hand, when an FCA defendant must continue to litigate an action 
that would otherwise have been barred, but was saved by the governmental 
veto, he may insist on his right to be informed of the grounds that saved the 
action from dismissal despite the proof that he has put forth determining it to 
be deserving of such an order.135 
132. See supra pp.16–19. 
133. See Nathan Sturycz, Comment, The King and I?: An Examination of the Interest 
Qui Tam Relators Represent and the Future of False Claims Litigation, 28 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 459, 475–86 (2009).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Guidance in this area may be found in the law surrounding the government’s 
right to move for dismissal of the action, whether or not it has intervened in 
the suit.136 The statute requires that a party whose action is being dismissed 
over his objection be “notifi ed by the Government . . .  [and be given] an 
opportunity for a hearing on the motion.”137 However, the section gives no 
guidelines to the court in determining the propriety of the motion to dismiss.138
 In United States ex rel. Sequoia  Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp.,139 
the government sought dismissal of an action into which it had not intervened. 
The court, mindful of the Executive’s need for prosecutorial discretion, stated:
Although courts are reluctant to scrutinize prosecutorial charging 
decisions, which involve many practical considerations outside 
the purview of judicial review, review of a decision to dismiss an 
FCA case is limited to determining whether the government has a 
legitimate government interest that will be achieved by dismissal, 
which is not arbitrary or otherwise illegal.  Historically courts have 
made such determinations of the lawfulness of executive function 
under a rational-basis standard140. . . “The court’s limited review 
of the motion to dismiss does not permit the court ‘to infringe on 
prosecutorial authority to a degree beyond the bounds established by 
Morrison’ and therefore does not violate the separation of powers.”141  
The court held that the defendant has the right to seek dismissal, regardless 
of its lack of intervention, but that the plaintiff had a right to judicial review 
of the motion.142
136. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2006).
137. Id. 
138. Id.
139. 151 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir.1998).
140. The Court applied a two-part rational basis standard: 1) whether the challenged 
action has a legitimate purpose; and 2) whether there is a reasonable fi t between the 
governmental purpose and the agency action. Id. See also United States ex rel. Ridenour 
v. Kaiser-Hill, Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Colo. 2001) (applying the Sequoia test 
and holding that the government need not prove conclusively that its interest would be 
adversely affected if the motion was not granted).
141. Id. at 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 
F.3d 743, 757 (9th Cir.1993)). 
142. Id. at 1145.
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In contrast, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Sequoia in 
Swift v. United States, holding that the plaintiff was only statutorily entitled to 
“a formal opportunity to convince the government not to end the case.”143 The 
Sequoia restriction on governmental discretion impacted the government’s 
prerogative “to take care that the laws be faithfully executed” under Article II.144 
The plaintiff was not entitled to discovery with regard to why the government 
moved to dismiss unless it could make a substantial threshold showing.145
Questions raised about the application of the government veto could concern 
some of these same matters: whether or not the government must intervene 
prior to using the veto, and whether or not the defendant is entitled to any 
type of challenge concerning the grounds upon which the government used 
its veto—provided they were stated. If the defendant is deemed to have such a 
right, the inquiry would likely relate to whether the reasons for using the veto 
were “arbitrary or otherwise illegal.” And a court would also have to determine 
what type of standard the defendant must meet to be entitled to discovery.
D. Recoveries and Resources
Another troublesome aspect of the newly-amended FCA is its likely 
impact on resources and recoveries. First, as has been argued here, one of the 
presuppositions to informer statutes is that the petitioner will earn his reward 
by providing information.146 The government is willing to forego part of its 
recovery—a considerable sum, as refl ected by the recent reporting of FCA 
settlement hauls—in favor of the relator.147 The logic is that the information 
would not have become known were it not for the whistleblower coming 
forward, so the share of the recovery is a cost well worth the spending. 
But on what grounds does a relator who would ordinarily be barred, but 
is not in fact barred because of the government’s use of its veto, deserve 
the reward carved out of the recovery? On what grounds is the public to be 
so substantially deprived of monies that would ordinarily go back into the 
143. 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (referring to Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
(1988)).
144. Id. at 253. The only exception would be if there was an allegation that fraud was 
perpetrated on the court. Id. The court also held that even if the government was required 
to intervene prior to its motion for dismissal, the court “could construe the government’s 
motion to dismiss as including a motion to intervene.” Id. at 252. 
145. Id. at 254 (quoting U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) where the 
Supreme Court held that the Defendant was not entitled to recovery absent a substantial 
threshold of dissimilar treatment from similarly situated parties).
146. See supra pp. 3–10.
147. According to the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, approximately $3 billion in civil 
False Claims Act settlements were recovered in fi scal year 2010, and $2.5 billion were in 
health care fraud recoveries. That is the largest health care fraud recovery in history for a 
fi scal year. The total of recoveries since 1986 is estimated at 26 billion. UNITED STATED 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RECOVERS $3 BILLION IN FALSE 
CLAIMS CASES IN FISCAL YEAR 2010 (November 22, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2010/November/10-civ-1335.html.
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treasury?148 In the case of the parasitic plaintiff, the argument can be made that 
he has risked his own personal resources and deserves some of the recovery, 
but the constitutional objections raised above challenge his right to participate 
at all. The workings of the veto can make the government complicit in its own 
deprivation of an earned recovery—funds that belong to the U.S. taxpayer, not 
to a particular individual who has decided to underwrite an action. 
Another concern arises with regard to judicial resources. With the power 
of the government veto, the courts will be required to hear suits that would 
ordinarily be barred.149 What the Department of Justice saves in resources by 
allowing a suit to proceed at the petitioner’s expense (when that petitioner 
would have ordinarily been barred), the courts will have to spend in hearing 
cases that would otherwise have to be brought by the government or not at all. 
This is an unquantifi able cost.
Settlements are more likely as well, not necessarily because a defendant has 
no case, but because the exposure to prolonged litigation is increased by way 
of the government veto of the public disclosure bar.150 In this way, increased 
power rests in the hands of the qui tam relator who has brought nothing to the 
case except his enthusiasm to fi nance it. And since the defendant cannot know 
when the government will intervene to save a suit that would have otherwise 
been barred in the past, the defendant must raise and prove the affi rmative 
defense of the Public Disclosure Bar. Only after that expense is paid will the 
defendant know if it was futile.
A great deal of the cost of the public disclosure bar defense will of course 
depend on when the veto is exercised. Presumably, the government veto must 
be exercised sometime after the pleadings stage but prior to judgment on the 
application of the bar. Although the most thorough study of what it costs to 
148. A recovery made by the government must be deposited into the treasury as per the 
Miscellaneous Receipts Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). See U.S. v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 
968 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “relator’s right to recovery exists solely as a mechanism 
for deterring fraud and returning funds to the federal treasury”); United States ex rel. Kelly 
v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 760 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that FCA is meant to remedy harms 
done to the U.S. treasury).
149. See 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A) (2011)); supra pp.10–11 (describing PPACA’s alterations to 
the FCA statute, including the addition of language that provides for a government veto of 
a court dismissal). 
150. See 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A) (2011)); supra pp.10–11 (describing PPACA’s alterations to 
the FCA statute, including the addition of language that provides for a government veto of 
a court dismissal).
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defend an FCA action is more than twenty years old, the fi gures amount to a 
heavy toll, particularly when the government has not intervened. 151
In a survey of defense contractors conducted in the early 1990s, out-of-
pocket legal costs ranged from $250,000 to $500,000 in the simplest of cases, 
when there was no parallel criminal inquiry taking place and the time frame for 
the litigation was short.152 In more intricate cases, the fi gures rose to between 
$1,000,000 and $10,000,000.153 In neither scenario do these fi gures take into 
account any internal costs incurred by the defendant in responding to the 
allegations. When the government did not intervene, the costs were particularly 
alarming relative to the recovery.
Out-of-pocket defense costs greatly exceed recoveries to the government 
in such matters.154 The survey participants were defendants in thirty-eight 
FCA suits in which: (a) a relator initiated the case; (b) the DOJ declined to 
participate; and (c) the matter had been disposed of either by a settlement or by 
a decision of a court.155 To defend themselves in these thirty-eight completed 
matters, the survey respondents spent approximately $53,403,000 on external 
legal costs.156 The total amount of FCA recoveries obtained in these matters 
Average expenditure in outside legal fees by defendants in these cases was 
$1,431,660, and the average FCA recovery was $97,223.157
Judging by these twenty year-old fi gures, the new powers of the FCA relator, 
especially now that the government veto may prolong a case that would have 
been jurisdictionally barred prior to passage of the PPACA amendments, are 
likely to make the costs to defend these suits worthy of another study.
E. Equitable and Professional Concerns
Even more policy concerns arise—or resurrect, as the case may be—with 
regard to equitable and professional objections to qui tam actions.
Other types of plaintiffs who act on behalf of the public at large must go 
through qualifi cation procedures. For instance, in order for a class action 
151. See William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation 
in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201 (1998). The study that 
was the subject of the Kovacic article was conducted by COOPERS & LYBRAND  and THE 
ANALYTICAL SCIENCES CORPORATION. Ten defense suppliers were surveyed as part of 
commission to determine the regulatory premium associated with existing procurement 
policies. Id. at 223. See also Daniel C. Lumm, The 2009 ‘Clarifi cations’ to the False 
Claims Act Of 1863: The All-Purpose Antifraud Statute with the Fun Qui Tam Twist, 45 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 527 (2010).
152. Kovacic, supra note 151, at 225.
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 226.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. 
2011]            BOUNTY HUNTERS AND WHISTLEBLOWERS              29 
plaintiff to be appointed lead plaintiff, he must meet a distinct set of criteria.158 
This is a process required even of a party who can claim injury in fact, entitling 
him Article III standing as a matter of right.159 With regard to securities actions 
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,160 the Plaintiff’s 
appointment largely hinges upon how great that injury has been relative to 
the class itself—so, in effect, the party with the greatest claim to standing 
in terms of the “injury in fact” requirement. In addition, he must prove his 
commitment to the action and that his interests are aligned with those of the 
other plaintiffs.161 
More generally speaking, no class action can proceed until the class is 
defi ned, which requires that members must join the class within a certain time 
frame.162 This ensures that every member plaintiff in the class show injury in 
fact, not just prospective injury. In other words, the requirement guarantees an 
immediacy with relation to the injury that resonates with the Article II standing 
requirement for actual, not conjectural, harm.163 The portrait of the class action 
member plaintiff in general, let alone the lead plaintiff, can be characterized as 
a party with “standing plus.”164 
In contrast, with regard to the qui tam relator whose suit has been saved by 
way of the government veto, there are practically no qualifi cations at all to his 
status.165 On top of a lack of injury in fact, the ties to the subject matter of the 
suit are no longer a qualifying pre-requisite, and the relator may proceed—
when the government consents—regardless of that fact.166 In this way, although 
she is ostensibly acting on behalf of the public—having blown the whistle on 
fraud—she may well have done nothing of the kind. The requirements that 
plaintiffs in other actions must go through are not applied at all in the qui tam 
action. The tenuousness of standing in these circumstances shows in greater 
relief when put in contrast with the standing of the class action plaintiff. And 
the difference is not only between the qui tam relator and class action plaintiffs; 
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) states that “one or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 
159. Id.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4 (2006). 
161. See Tanne v. Autobytel, Inc. 226 F.R.D. 659 (C.D. Cal., 2005) (setting out factors 
used to determine lead plaintiff in class action suit).
162. FED. R. CIV. P.  23(c)(1)(B).
163. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
164. Id.
165. See supra pp. 23–25.
166. See supra pp. 23–25.
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a similar contrast exists between FCA qui tam relators and antitrust litigants,167 
as well as RICO plaintiffs suing under a private right of action.168
Finally, a troublesome professional concern may also arise. One of the 
earliest forms of abuse was by way of lawyers seeking to piggyback actions 
onto information that had already been made public.169 Without a means to 
screen out such parasitic actions by way of a conclusive, rather than an open-
ended, public disclosure bar, the professional bounty hunter lawyer could 
return from the precincts to which he has been banished in this country for 
nearly seventy years. A client with some relationship to the suit might be 
sought, one who can fi nance the suit for the chance at a recovery that will be 
all the more likely to come about through settlement, especially now that the 
ties to the subject matter need not be dispositive of the right to bring the action. 
Direct attorney involvement in the whistleblowing area is not uncommon.170  
CONCLUSION
The fi ve word alteration to the FCA wrought by PPACA has issued in a new 
set of concerns with regard to the constitutionality of FCA. These concerns 
have lain on a quieter plain for many years. The constitutionality of the FCA, 
which had at least won approval from the Supreme Court on the issue of 
standing, is now compromised, not only on the standing question, but also 
with regard to the Appointments Clause and Take Care Clause. Finally, the 
policy concerns that are likely to follow only heighten the debate that will 
unfold in the future.
167. See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling 
Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1995) 
(explaining standing of antitrust litigants); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard 
Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: the Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 331(2007)(contrasting qui tam relators and various other types 
of plaintiffs
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006).
169. See, e.g., U.S. v. Burmah Oil Co., Ltd., 558 F.2d 43, 46 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1977). 
170. See Fair Laboratory Practices Assoc. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., S.D.N.Y. No. 
05 Civ. 5393 (RPP) (Apr. 5, 2011) (dismissing an FCA action brought by a former general 
counsel of the defendant, reasoning that the ethical duties to an attorney’s clients were held 
to trump all FCA concerns).
